A Single Health Care System for a Reunited Germany by Radich, Nicole A.
Lehigh University
Lehigh Preserve
A unified Germany in federal Europe Perspectives on Business and Economics
1-1-1996
A Single Health Care System for a Reunited
Germany
Nicole A. Radich
Lehigh University
Follow this and additional works at: http://preserve.lehigh.edu/perspectives-v14
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Perspectives on Business and Economics at Lehigh Preserve. It has been accepted for
inclusion in A unified Germany in federal Europe by an authorized administrator of Lehigh Preserve. For more information, please contact
preserve@lehigh.edu.
Recommended Citation
Radich, Nicole A., "A Single Health Care System for a Reunited Germany" (1996). A unified Germany in federal Europe. Paper 1.
http://preserve.lehigh.edu/perspectives-v14/1
A SINGLE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
FOR A REUNIFIED GERMANY 
Nicole A. Radich 
The signing of the German Reunification 
Treaty on August 31, 1990, ushered in a new era 
of German history. For the first time in forty-five 
years, Germany stood as a united nation. As the 
Berlin Wall fell , the German people rejoiced; but 
along with the jubilation came confusion and 
anxiety as questions of merging the two former 
nations' political, economic, and social systems 
arose. One of the greatest challenges facing 
German leaders at that time was the consolida-
tion of the East and West German health care 
systems. While the East German system of 
national health service lay in a state of complete 
disarray, West Germany's comprehensive and 
compulsory health insurance scheme (com-
monly called statutory health insurance) ranked 
as one of the world's best health care systems. 
Legislators planned to transform the East 
German system into a social-insurance plan 
modeled on that of West Germany, but many 
details remained uncertain as the 16 million cit-
izens of the former East Germany entered the 
West German health care system on January 1, 
1991. (Katz, p. 141) Now, several years later, the 
success of the reunification of the former East 
1 
and West German health care systems remains 
questionable as Germany wrestles with the prob-
lem of rising health care costs. 
The current German health care system 
upholds the same basic principles introduced 
in the social insurance scheme developed by 
Bismarck in 1883. The initial health insurance 
system relied on a network of "sickness funds ," 
which are still primarily responsible for cover-
age in Germany today. Sickness funds are 
autonomous and self-financed insurance orga-
nizations that provide a minimum package of 
benefits to all members. (Navarro , p. 567) 
Membership in sickness funds is mandatory for 
most of the German population, and the sick-
ness funds take a specific percentage of a work-
er 's earnings annually, with employees and 
employers splitting the premiums. (Roy, p. 
1390) Through the sickness funds , most of 
Germany's citizens have access to a compre-
hensive set of medical benefits . Thus , the 
German system manages to provide high-qual-
ity medical care to all citizens at a cost the 
country considers socially acceptable. (Iglehart, 
p. 508) This ideal of universal access to health 
care at an affordable cost has guided the evolu-
tion of the German health system over the past 
century; even the health systems that developed 
in the two new German states after 1945, while 
drastically different, guaranteed health care to 
all citizens at a reasonable price. To maintain 
universal access to health services at an afford-
able cost after German reunification, numer-
ous reforms had to be implemented in the 
health system. To fully comprehend the scope 
of these reforms and their effects on health care, 
it is necessary to understand the principles that 
have guided the development of the German 
health care system since its birth 112 years ago. 
Evolution of the German Health 
Care System 
Otto von Bismarck, who unified the dis-
parate German states into a nation, is credited 
with founding Germany's health care system in 
1883; however, the roots of Bismarck's nation-
al system of health insurance reach back to the 
Middle Ages, when sickness funds first devel-
oped. In medieval times, sickness funds were 
cooperative organizations to which members 
paid fixed amounts in exchange for cash bene-
fits in time of sickness, injury, or death. (Knox, 
p. 24) Since medieval medicine had little to 
offer, cash grants were by far the most impor-
tant benefit of the sickness funds. As medical 
knowledge increased through the years, sick-
ness funds began to cover the services of physi-
cians. By the time the German states were uni-
fied into a nation in 1871, sickness funds had 
become the basis of a rudimentary health insur-
ance network. 
In an attempt to quell social unrest among 
workers emigrating to German cities during the 
Industrial Revolution and to check the growing 
strength of labor unions, Bismarck proposed a 
national social insurance system in 1883. The 
concept of a national social insurance system 
arose from the principle of social solidarity, 
which is the belief that nations are obligated to 
provide a strong network of social benefits to 
all their citizens. (Iglehart, p. 504) In regard to 
health care, social solidarity represents a col-
lective agreement to share the risks and costs 
of a necessary good, which means that the rich 
subsidize the poor, the healthy support the sick, 
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and workers help the unemployed. (Knox, p. 19) 
Indeed, social solidarity provided the rationale 
for the income-related nature of health care 
financing which Germany adopted in 1883. 
The Health Insurance Act of 1883 gave 
sickness funds the responsibility of providing 
medical care to all blue-collar workers (Knox, 
p. 27) ; however, many Germans were subse-
quently excluded from the statutory health 
insurance scheme, such as farmers , self-em-
ployed people, pensioners, and civil servants. 
Revisions of the original law over the years 
expanded the system to cover all Germans. 
Under the Health Insurance Act, the sickness 
funds hired physicians as employees. The 
numerous conflicts that resulted between doc-
tors and sickness funds eventually prompted 
sickness funds to turn over the money allocat-
ed to fees so that the associated physicians could 
divide it up among themselves. (Roy, p. 1389) 
In 1931, the Weimar Settlement estab-
lished associations of sickness-fund doctors to 
negotiate collectively with the sickness funds 
over reimbursement. Physicians were now 
organized into a bargaining monopoly against 
the sickness funds; the balance of power 
between the sickness funds and physicians had 
been tipped in the doctors ' favor by the Weimar 
Settlement. (Knox, p. 34) However, the rise of 
Hitler and the Third Reich soon shattered that 
balance of power for Hitler stripped both the 
sickness funds and the physicians' associations 
of their autonomy and placed the health care 
system under government control. 
Adolf Hitler and the National Socialists did 
not share Bismarck's vision of health insurance 
as a way to promote political stability and 
encourage the development of civic spirit with-
out the loss of individuality. (Iglehart, p. 505) 
Instead, Hitler envisioned health insurance as 
a means to achieve the Third Reich 's goal of a 
healthy, productive, fit , and racially pure 
German state. (Knox, p. 34) Once Hitler 
became chancellor in 1933, he appointed a chief 
to manage all the sickness funds; this move 
stripped the sickness funds of their autonomy. 
Also, the National Socialists barred non-Aryan 
physicians from treating sickness-fund patients 
and required that Aryan doctors possess a com-
prehensive knowledge of eugenic racial theory. 
(Iglehart, p. 505) Ultimately, the National 
Socialists succeeded in reducing the power of 
the sickness funds while strengthening the 
position of ambulatory care (office-based) physi-
cians not associated with the sickness funds. 
However, after the fall of the Third Reich, sick-
ness funds regained their central role in the 
health care system, at least in West Germany. 
The division of Germany into two states at 
the conclusion of World War II had dramatic 
effects on the health insurance system. The 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG or West 
Germany) reinstated the decentralized, largely 
private system of health insurance that had 
begun in 1883. Meanwhile, the German 
Democratic Republic (CDR or East Germany) 
adopted a strongly centralized, state-operated 
health care system loosely modeled on the 
USSR's health insurance system. Needless to 
say, the merging of these two systems in 1990 
has posed one of the major challenges of 
German reunification. To fully comprehend the 
problems encountered in creating one health 
system for reunified Germany, the structures of 
the former East and West German health care 
systems must be considered more closely. 
The East German Health Care 
System 
When the Soviets gained control of 
Germany's eastern sector at the end of World 
War II, the health care infrastructure lay in 
shambles; many physicians had fled west as the 
Soviet Army swept into eastern Germany. (Knox, 
p. 242) The situation warranted immediate, 
decisive action to restore health care services for 
the citizens of East Germany. The Soviets quick-
ly began rebuilding East Germany's health care 
infrastructure, for they saw this as an ideal 
opportunity to prove the superiority of socialist 
health care over "corrupt" capitalist models. 
Within months of the war's conclusion, the 
Soviets had abolished the traditional German 
separation between hospital and ambulatory 
care and established a Central Health 
Administration to preside over the entire health 
system. A Soviet decree in 1947 eliminated pri-
vate practice and established a network of ambu-
latories (primary care centers) and polyclinics 
(multispecialty outpatient centers); almost all 
health care workers were now employees of the 
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state and subject to its rigid rules and regula-
tions. (Knox, p. 243) With these actions, the 
Soviets succeeded in creating a health care sys-
tem in East Germany that structurally resem-
bled the Soviet Union's system. However, the 
method of financing the system was much dif-
ferent from that in the Soviet Union. 
East Germany maintained the Bismarck-
ian model of universal and comprehensive 
health care coverage by organizing a single, 
state-managed health insurance network. 
Eighty-nine percent of the East German popu-
lation were insured through the Free German 
Trade Union, and the other eleven percent 
(which included the self-employed, members of 
cooperatives, state employees, and their depen-
dents) were covered by the state. (Knox, p. 243) 
Like the pre-war sickness funds, the insurance 
scheme was financed by workers, who con-
tributed ten percent of their gross wages, and 
by employers, who contributed an equal 
amount. The state itself guaranteed the fiscal 
health of the plan and all benefits. 
Higher-income workers could secure extra ben-
efits for an additional ten percent deduction. 
Dependents were automatically insured, as well 
as citizens in retirement or on disability, result-
ing in nearly universal health care coverage. 
(Katz, p. 144) 
Initially, the East German national health 
service achieved some successes, most notably 
in the areas of maternal and child care. Since 
the East German government's top priority was 
increasing the labor pool, it was vital for women 
to bear children to replenish the nation's deplet-
ed stock of workers. (Knox, p. 245) Therefore, 
East Germany's health insurance system 
included an array of child-centered programs; 
they included child-care programs at the work 
site, maternal and child health care initiatives 
with financial inducements to encourage par-
ticipation, and school health programs. 
Additionally, East German parents were offered 
monthly financial allowances for each child, 
interest-free housing loans, and a OM 1,000 
cash bounty per infant. This birth bounty was 
paid in installments to expectant mothers who 
kept their prenatal and postnatal care appoint-
ments. (Knox, p. 245) Also, most women had 
the option of one-year paid maternity leave. 
(Scharf, p. 17) These programs did not solve 
East Germany's labor shortage, but they did 
reduce infant mortality rates and pregnancy-
related maternal deaths to levels comparable 
with those of much wealthier nations, includ-
ing West Germany and the United States. 
(Knox, p. 249) 
Although East Germany achieved some 
impressive public health successes in the areas 
of maternal and child care during the 1950s and 
1960s, the 1970s began a long period of decline 
resulting from limited resources and an ossify-
ing bureaucracy. (Knox, p. 241) Shortages of 
basic supplies such as sterile syringes, rubber 
gloves, and intravenous tubing often occurred, 
even in major hospitals. The nation's largest 
hospital , Berlin-Buch Hospital, also suffered 
severe shortages of the high-tech equipment 
necessary for such specialized procedures as 
organ transplants, open-heart surgery, and 
neonatal intensive care. (Knox, p. 255) The sit-
uations in ordinary doctors ' offices were even 
worse. Hartmut Reichwage, a 63-year-old fam-
ily practitioner who practiced in the CDR, tells 
of working in an office with outdated medical 
technology and very limited access to drugs and 
supplies. He describes working with only "a 
stethoscope, a microscope for urinary sediment, 
a blood pressure cuff, an ear mirror- nothing 
else." (Knox, p. 256) By the time of reunifica-
tion, the dismal state of the East German health 
care system contrasted sharply with the suc-
cessful and efficient West German system. 
The West German Health Care 
System 
The Allied forces that controlled the west-
ern sector of Germany at World War II 's end did 
not interfere with the health care system since 
the fundamentals of the system had survived 
the brutalities and tumult of the Third Reich 
relatively intact. (Knox, pp. 35-36) The 
Statutory Health Insurance System (SHI) of 
pre-war Germany reestablished its roots. The 
SHI was traditionally characterized by the prin-
ciples of self-administration, third-party pay-
ment, and solidarity; and these principles 
remained intact in the postwar health care sys-
tem. (Muller, p. 1658) The principle of 
self-administration delegated the responsibili-
ty of financing and providing health care to 
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self-governing and self-regulating institutions 
(the sickness funds and physicians' organiza-
tions) , with the federal government providing 
a legislative framework. (Ade et al., p. 253) The 
third-party payment system guaranteed that an 
insured person received the medical attention 
necessary to treat an illness without having to 
pay for any services directly; instead, the physi-
cian was reimbursed from the sickness fund via 
the regional physicians' associations. (Muller, 
p. 1658) The solidarity principle ensured that 
individuals receive all necessary medical serv-
ices but contributed only according to their 
ability to pay; contributions from insured per-
sons were based solely on their income, regard-
less of sex, age, or health risk. (Ade et al., p. 252) 
Since the West German health care system was 
extended to all of Germany upon reunification, 
sickness funds and physicians ' organizations 
remain responsible for the delivery and financ-
ing of health care in Germany today. Thus, the 
structure of the current German health care 
system closely resembles that of the former 
West German system. 
The West German health care system is 
highly decentralized, consisting of approxi-
mately 1,300 autonomous statutory sickness 
funds that insure about ninety percent of the 
population. The sickness funds can be divided 
into two groups: 1) primary funds , consisting 
of local funds, industrial funds, craft funds, 
rural funds , a sailors' fund, and a miners ' fund; 
and 2) substitute funds , which some blue-col-
lar workers and white-collar workers can join 
if they earn above a set income ceiling. (Ade et 
al, p. 253) Membership in the primary funds is 
determined mainly by place of residence or 
occupation. (Iglehart, p. 506) The substitute 
funds , however, are open only to those who 
qualify for membership; consequently, 
white-collar workers frequently have the oppor-
tunity to choose between a primary fund or a 
substitute fund. (Ade et al. , p. 253) Although 
the benefits of the two funds are basically the 
same, substitute funds carry a degree of social 
prestige since membership is an emblem of 
higher employment status. Also, substitute 
funds pay doctors about twice as much as pri-
mary funds do; therefore, substitute funds are 
believed to buy their members better service. 
(Knox, p. 14) 
Sickness fund members can select any 
ambulatory care physician as their primary 
physician. Upon visiting the office of their cho-
sen physician, patients give the receptionist or 
secretary a treatment voucher on which the 
doctor notes the services provided. Patients 
receive only one treatment voucher per quar-
ter; during that quarter, patients can only visit 
the physician who has their treatment vouch-
er. Therefore, sickness- fund members can only 
visit one physician per quarter, but no limit 
exists on how many times the patients can visit 
their chosen physician. If a patient needs to see 
a specialist, the primary physician must give the 
patient a referral certificate. At the end of the 
quarter, primary physicians submit treatment 
vouchers to their regional physicians' associa-
tion for reimbursement. No money passes 
between sickness fund members and their 
physicians, so in most instances the patients 
have no idea how much their treatment costs. 
(Iglehart, p. 508) 
Financing the System 
Sickness funds finance health care main-
ly from payroll deductions and from payments 
made by employers. The funds calculate annu-
ally the amount of money they require for 
self-sustained operation and then set the rate 
at which employees and employers contribute. 
(Iglehart, p. 506) Employees and employers 
both contribute equal payments to the funds, 
which are calculated as a percentage of each 
employee's gross income. The current deduc-
tion rate averages a combined 13 percent. 
Since the sickness funds do not receive addi-
tional funding from the government, they must 
ensure that health care costs in one period do 
not exceed their revenues. (Ade et al., p. 254) 
Once the sickness funds collect the insur-
ance premiums from employees and employ-
ers, they turn the money over to the regional 
associations of physicians, which reimburse the 
doctors for medical services performed on the 
basis of the negotiated fee schedule. All doctors 
who treat sickness-funds patients must be 
members of a regional association of physicians. 
These regional associations pay doctors for the 
care they provide, monitor their patterns of 
service to patients, and ensure that all sickness-
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fund members have access to ambulatory care. 
(Iglehart, p. 507) 
Regional physicians' associations repre-
sent only ambulatory care doctors; other types 
of organizations represent hospital-based physi-
cians. These two types of organizations exhib-
it the clear distinction in West Germany 
between hospital physicians and ambulatory 
physicians. (von der Schulenburg, p. 14 78) 
More than ninety percent of ambulatory care 
doctors are prohibited from treating patients in 
hospitals; likewise, most hospital-based physi-
cians cannot treat patients on an ambulatory 
care basis. While ambulatory care doctors are 
reimbursed on a fee-for-service basis through 
the sickness funds, hospital-based physicians 
are salaried workers paid by the hospital at a 
level determined by specialty and seniority. The 
money needed to pay the salaries of 
hospital-based doctors comes from each hospi-
tal's operating costs. Hospitals receive their 
operating money from sickness funds while 
their capital comes mostly from state and local 
government contributions. (Iglehart, p. 507) 
Availability and Quality of Care 
As mentioned previously, roughly ninety 
percent of West Germany's population are cov-
ered by the statutory health insurance system. 
Approximately eight percent of the population 
have private insurance, and the remaining two 
percent, which consists mainly of civil servants, 
are covered by special government arrange-
ments.(Ade et al., p. 253) By law, private insur-
ance is only available to people who earn above 
a set income ceiling. Since private insurers 
often reimburse doctors at a higher rate than 
the SHI, higher income Germans often believe 
they can "buy" better health care by opting for 
private insurance. Once people leave the SHI, 
they may only return if their income drops 
below the ceiling again. (von der Schulenburg, 
p. 1474) Some people with high income choose 
not to participate in the SHI or buy private 
insurance; these people constitute the 0.5% of 
the West German population that have no 
health care coverage at all. (Ade et al., p. 253) 
Thus, the West German health care system suc-
ceeds in providing universal access to health 
care for those people who want it. 
Moreover, the quality of care guaranteed to 
West Germans by the national health care sys-
tem far surpasses that of medical services offered 
in all other western countries. According to 
Richard Knox, author of Germany 's Health 
System, the standard package of benefits offered 
by the sickness funds includes: 
• unlimited ambulatory physician care, 
generally without co-payment, 
including home visits; 
• unlimited hospital care, with minor 
co-payments (for the first ten days); 
• maternity care (including household 
help); 
• prescription drugs with limited 
co-payments; 
• medical supplies and devices; 
• preventive care; 
• family planning services; 
• rehabilitative services, including 
attendants; 
• periodic "rest cures" at certified 
health spas; 
• dental care, with co-payments for 
dentures; 
• optical services and eyeglasses; 
• ambulance transport. (p. 14) 
Dependents of SHI members also receive the 
same comprehensive coverage. (Ade et al. , p. 
254) This impressive list of benefits illustrates 
the high quality of care most West Germans 
have expected during the postwar era. 
Furthermore, West Germany has not suffered 
the shortage of medical equipment, supplies, 
and drugs that plagued East Germany; obvi-
ously this has allowed the standard of health 
care to be much higher in the West. Citizens 
of West Germany have also found high-tech 
care to be easily accessible, for modern medical 
technology is quite common throughout the 
country. (Knox, p. 257) Overall , the West 
Germans have enjoyed comprehensive medical 
care from a health system that most people con-
sider to be one of the world's best. 
Health Care Reforms Prior to 
Reunification 
By the 1980s, West Germany had suc-
ceeded in meeting the four objectives that all 
health care systems strive for: universal access, 
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high quality, free choice of physician, and 
socially acceptable cost. (Roy, p. 1389) To 
achieve these high standards of health care, a 
great deal of consensus and compromise had to 
occur between the sickness funds and the 
providers ' organizations. The philosophy of 
consensus and compromise stems from a cul-
tural preference that favors obtaining a com-
promise before deadlock occurs, a preference 
that is quite evident throughout German life. 
(Iglehart, p. 503) However, sickness funds and 
providers ' organizations have not always been 
able to reach agreements without government 
intervention. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the West 
German government had to intervene in the 
largely private health insurance system. In an 
attempt to combat soaring health care costs, the 
government implemented a series of reforms 
aimed at containing costs. The first of these 
reforms, the Health Care Cost Containment Act 
of 1977, codified the cost control goals while 
maintaining the principle of social solidarity and 
establishing stability in the payroll deduction 
rate. The law also created the Uniform 
Evaluation Standard to eliminate unrestricted 
negotiations of physicians ' service budgets 
between the sickness funds and the physicians' 
associations. The Uniform Evaluation Standard 
defined the schedule of charges for medical serv-
ices and their relative point values so that all 
physicians could be reimbursed at the same 
rates for the same services. (Ade et al., pp. 8-9) 
Further cost increases and a declining 
economy caused the government to implement 
additional cost containment acts in 1981 and 
1982. The reforms included decreases in den-
tal coverage, the number of hospital beds, and 
the allowed length of stay for childbirth. Also, 
price freezes were established for medications 
and medical appliances, and co-payments were 
instituted for some items. (Roy, p. 1391) In 
response to rising hospital fees , the Federal 
Hospital Payment Regulation of 1986 intro-
duced prospective budgets to the sickness funds 
and hospitals for their approval, along with arbi-
tration of disagreements. (Roy, p. 1391) As 
physician expenditures continued to grow, the 
West German government implemented an 
expenditure cap in 1987 to limit the growth in 
physician spending to the increase in the aver-
age German wage. (Ade et al., p. 9) The most 
drastic reforms of the statutory insurance sys-
tem came with the Health Care Reform Act of 
1989. These reforms doubled the minimum 
contributions required of voluntarily insured 
(wealthy) patients and introduced the concept 
by which the patient pays up front and is reim-
bursed (in an attempt to increase the patient's 
sensitivity to costs). Furthermore, patient 
co-payments were increased for prescription 
drugs, dental prostheses, spa visits, and hospi-
talization. (Roy, p. 1391) 
These reforms effectively controlled health 
care expenditures, for West Germany came the 
closest of all western countries during the 
1980s to limiting increases in health care 
spending to a rate equal to the growth of its 
national income. (Iglehart, p. 503) But the 
greatest challenge of cost containment for the 
West German health care system loomed ahead, 
as reunification in 1990 introduced the 16 mil-
lion citizens of the former East Germany into 
West Germany's health insurance network. 
Unifying the Two German Health 
Care Systems 
The reunification of Germany in 1990 
revealed the dismal state of the former CDR's 
socialist health care system. In order to avoid 
social chaos in the Eastern states, a new health 
insurance system had to be erected quickly. 
Many people from both sides of the fallen Berlin 
Wall believed that Germany should preserve in 
the unified health care system some of the 
Eastern health care values and institutions that 
had worked well. However, the West German 
government decided to completely abolish the 
East German system and replace it with the 
West German system. 
The plan for health care reunification was 
outlined in two treaties between the CDR and 
the FRG prior to reunification. Article 21 of the 
Treaty of May 18, 1990, between the CDR and 
the FRG establishing monetary, economic, and 
social union stated: 
The German Democratic Republic 
shall introduce all necessary measures 
to adapt its health insurance law to that 
of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
(Press and Information Office of the 
Federal Government, p. 21) 
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Also, Article 22 of that treaty mandates the CDR 
to "move towards the range of services offered 
in the Federal Republic of Germany with pri-
vate providers ... " (Press and Information 
Office ... , p. 22) Furthermore, the Reunification 
Treaty of August 31, 1990, Article 33, stated: 
It shall be the task of legislators to cre-
ate the conditions for effecting a rapid 
and lasting improvement in in-patient 
care in [East Germany] ... and for 
bringing it into line with the situation 
in the remainder of the federal terri-
tory. (Press and Information Office ... , 
p. 84) 
The provisions of these two treaties 
arranged for the West German health care sys-
tem to extend its coverage into the Eastern 
states while the former East German system 
was dismantled. 
While the plan for health care reunifica-
tion appeared straightforward, complexities 
arose as the West German government discov-
ered the East's crumbling health infrastructure. 
Medical technology in the East was far below 
West Germany's accustomed standards. 
Additionally, most of the East's hospitals had 
severe structural problems, including leaky 
roofs, inadequate sewage and sanitation facili-
ties, dysfunctional heating systems, and dan-
gerously outdated electrical systems. (Knox, p. 
259) To bring the East's hospitals up to the 
standards of the West, the estimated cost was 
$20 billion (Iglehart, p. 1756); a much higher 
price was projected to completely remake the 
East's health care system according to Western 
standards. West Germany's first step in 1990 
was the immediate aid program, which allocat-
ed OM 520 million ($248 million) to begin 
upgrading the East's failing health infrastruc-
ture. (Knox, p. 259) A more ambitious effort 
termed "Soaring East," was introduced i~ 
1990-91. It directed OM 5 billion ($2.4 billion) 
toward restoring and rebuilding hospitals and 
facilities for the elderly and disabled. 
Furthermore, a three-part financing program, 
proposed in 1993 and begun in 1995, will fun-
nel OM 2.1 billion ($1 billion) annually to 
Eastern hospitals for the next decade. (Knox, p. 
260) These government financing programs 
were aimed primarily at upgrading the East's 
health care infrastructure after reunification· 
the next step was to organize the new financ~ 
ing and service-delivery systems in the East. 
To finance the expansion of West 
Germany's health care system to the East, 
approximately 200 new statutory sickness funds 
were established in the Eastern states. These 
new sickness funds were modeled after West 
German funds both in benefits and premium 
levels; the premiums were initially set at 12.8 
percent of gross wages, split equally between 
employer and employee. (Katz, p. 146) 
Government officials expected the new funds to 
have less income than the older funds in the 
West because of lower wage rates and higher 
unemployment rates in the East. To account 
for this discrepancy, residents of the former 
CDR received benefits only up to the billing 
rates of their local doctors, whereas the citizens 
of the Western states enjoyed benefits that cov-
ered any appropriate doctor, whether in the 
East, the West, or other countries. Although 
this rule stemmed from the financial goal of 
keeping expenditures in line with predicted 
fund income, it prevented an immediate col-
lapse of the former CDR health care infra-
structure. Because East Germans could not 
afford to pay the higher prices of West German 
physicians, they could not leave their own 
health care delivery system. (Katz, p. 14 7) 
Surprisingly, the new sickness funds had a sur-
plus at the end of 1991 of OM 2.7 billion ($1.3 
billion). The principal reasons for this surplus 
were that residents of the former CDR have 
fewer dependents than Westerners and also use 
their health care services less frequently. (Knox, 
p. 264) Thus, creating a new system of financ-
ing health care coverage in the former CDR 
turned out to be a relatively simple task. On 
the other hand, reorganizing the service-deliv-
ery system resulted in quite a struggle. 
Very few physicians of the former East 
Germany were private practitioners. The state 
had employed the majority of the doctors to 
work in hospitals or polyclinics. This arrange-
ment presented a unique problem to the health 
care reunification process, for the West German 
system relied mainly on private practitioners. 
To completely convert the Eastern system to 
Western standards, the polyclinics had to be dis-
mantled in favor of private practices. The fate 
of polyclinics - multispecialty groups of 
salaried physicians working in conjunction with 
public health workers, social workers, physical 
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therapists, psychologists, and other personnel 
- became a center of controversy. (Knox, p. 
267) At the time of reunification, ninety per-
cent of East German physicians supported poly-
clinics, as did most of the public. Many people 
argued that polyclinics should be preserved in 
the East's new health care system as an alter-
native practice mode because of their adminis-
trative efficiencies as well as the medical bene-
fits of interdisciplinary groups. (Knox, p. 268) 
Unfortunately, West Germany's government 
gave into the demands of providers' associa-
tions, who feared that polyclinics would end 
their monopoly over ambulatory care services, 
and ordered the polyclinics to be dismantled 
over a five-year period. (Knox, p. 269) Thus, 
physicians once employed by the state-run poly-
clinics had to set up private practices if they 
wanted to continue offering medical care. 
The transition of physicians from state 
employees to private practitioners presented 
numerous difficulties. To set up private prac-
tices, the doctors had to lease or purchase med-
ical equipment, hire staff, and rent office space, 
things they never did previously as employees 
of the East German state. (Iglehart, p. 504) 
Western banks readily loaned money to Eastern 
doctors, which facilitated the conversion. Also, 
the Western physicians' associations coached 
their Eastern colleagues in all facets of the tran-
sition. Because of these measures, the conver-
sion to private practice occurred rapidly; with-
in the space of two years, East German 
medicine was transformed from an almost com-
pletely salaried, state-run enterprise to an 
entirely private, fee-for-service model. (Knox, 
p. 270) Physicians of the former CDR rapidly 
adjusted to the new method of health care deliv-
ery, with their greatly increased salaries being 
an added bonus. 
Thus far, the reunification of Germany's 
health care system seems to be a success. 
Expansion of the West German system to the 
new Eastern states occurred quickly; three-quar-
ters of the population of the Eastern states had 
comprehensive coverage by June 1991. (Knox, 
p. 263) Unfortunately, the hasty decisions made 
during the transition period eliminated some 
beneficial characteristics of the East German 
system. For example, the strong emphasis on 
maternal and child health and preventive care, 
the hallmarks of the former East German sys-
tem, should have been adopted into the unified 
system. Furthermore, the dismantling of the 
polyclinics eliminated an opportunity to 
increase the cooperation of in- and outpatient 
care which might have resulted in a reduction 
of hospitalization time. (von der Schulenburg, 
p. 1480) In retrospect, legislators might have 
missed an opportunity to improve Germany's 
health care system by eliminating these features 
of the East German system. However, these 
oversights are understandable, for the govern-
ment was more concerned with the economic 
burden of health care reunification. 
Health Care Reforms Since 
Reunification 
For the two decades prior to reunification, 
West Germany attempted to regulate rising 
health care costs with cost control interven-
tions. The overriding goal of the cost contain-
ment policies was to keep the average rate at 
which employers and employees pay premiums 
to the sickness funds consistent with increases 
in workers' wages and salaries. In essence, the 
West German government had declared that it 
had reached the limit in the proportion of the 
gross national product it wanted to allocate to 
health care. (Iglehart, p. 1751) Instead of 
reducing benefits or increasing patient 
cost-sharing requirements, the government 
imposed tighter controls on physicians' fees and 
hospital budgets. These cost containment mea-
sures had proved very effective during the 1980s 
in restraining the growth in medical expendi-
tures to a rate approximately equal to the 
growth rate of the economy. (Iglehart, p. 1752) 
However, German reunification greatly 
increased health care expenditures. Reform of 
the system was once again needed to combat 
rising medical care costs. The first reform 
attempt involved replacing the expenditure-cap 
mechanism (established in 1987) with an 
expenditure-targeting mechanism. The expen-
diture-targeting mechanism targeted physi-
cians' expenditures toward a yearly growth rate 
instead of capping the growth in physician pay-
ments each quarter by the growth in income of 
the sickness-fund members that quarter. The 
expenditure-cap mechanism limited growth in 
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physician payment during 1992, but the 
increase was still greater than the growth in 
income per sickness-fund member. (Ade et al., 
p. 10) Clearly, something more needed to be 
done to control health care spending. 
At the end of 1992, the German govern-
ment passed a major health care reform pack-
age that introduced further cost control mea-
sures and made fundamental structural 
changes in the health care network. The pack-
age, referred to as the 1993 Health Care Reform 
Act, was designed to limit overall expenditures 
through control of the volume as well as the 
price of physician services and pharmaceuticals. 
(Ade et al., p. 11) Also, the law removed the lim-
its on choice of sickness fund for certain popu-
lation groups and established a financial risk 
equalization scheme; this allowed the sickness 
funds to compete against one another for mem-
bers. Furthermore, the law reformed the hos-
pital payment system. (Ade et al., p. 11) In an 
attempt to lessen the sharp distinction between 
ambulatory care and hospital care, the reform 
law allowed hospitals to provide outpatient care 
prior to hospitalization, and office-based physi-
cians to perform certain operations outside hos-
pitals (von der Schulenburg, p. 1478); this was 
the first major attempt to reform structural 
aspects of the German health care system. 
The 1993 Health Care Reform Act con-
tained special provisions for the new Eastern 
states. Growth in physician expenditure was 
allowed to increase by a greater percentage in 
the former CDR than in the Western states. 
(Ade et al., p. 12) Also, the Health Care Reform 
Act simplified the process of private capital 
investment in Eastern hospitals. Legislators 
hoped that private capital would help upgrade 
the East's technologically and physically inferi-
or hospitals. (Ade et al., p. 261) 
The 1993 Health Care Reform Act went 
into effect on January 1, 1993, and the effects 
were seen almost immediately. While health 
care costs during the first half of 1992 had risen 
by 11 percent relative to the previous year, 
expenditures in the first six months of 1993 
decreased 2. 7 percent from the previous year. 
(Muller, p. 1660) Finally, Germany seems to 
have found an effective solution to the problem 
of rising health care costs. 
Concluding Remarks 
Through its turbulent 112 year existence, 
the German health care system has succeeded 
in providing universal access to medical serv-
ices at a socially acceptable cost. In the ongo-
ing battle against rising health care costs, 
Germany has already implemented many 
reforms to its system. Two more reform pack-
ages are in the works, one for 1996 and the 
other for the year 2000 .. Hopefully these two 
laws will be as successful as the 1993 Health 
Care Reform Act in stabilizing health care 
expenditures without trimming benefits. 
Prior to reunification, the citizens of West 
Germany enjoyed one of the most comprehen-
sive health insurance systems in the world. 
Many people doubted that the system would sur-
vive the reunification process. However, the 
health care system "transplant," while not nec-
essarily the best course of treatment, seems to 
have been successful. The patient readily accept-
ed the "transplant" and is recuperating nicely. 
The long-term success of the operation remains 
to be determined, but the prognosis is optimistic. 
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